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WHAT CONSTITUTES “CUSTODY” UNDER
MIRANDA?: AN EXAMINATION OF MAINE’S TEST
AS APPLIED IN STATE V. KITTREDGE
Elizabeth L. Tull*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
has issued several opinions addressing whether a defendant’s statements are
admissible when made to law enforcement in the absence of “Miranda warnings.”1
These cases have similar features: a defendant made a personally incriminating
statement; raised an appeal alleging that Miranda warnings should have been, but
were not, read to him or her; and the Court—in many cases—determined that the
defendant was not technically in police custody, and thus there was no requirement
to recite Miranda warnings to him or her.
Miranda warnings are an important safeguard that citizens of the United States
are afforded to protect themselves from self-incrimination.2 One reason these
warnings are so crucial to a fair defense is because a “defendant’s confession . . .
‘has long been regarded as powerfully incriminating’ evidence” in a criminal trial.3
In fact, a confession is likely “‘the most probative and damaging evidence that can
be admitted against [a defendant]’” because it is direct evidence of facts “‘from the
actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of
information.’”4
Because confessions have such a powerful impact in a criminal case, it is
important that Miranda warnings are delivered at a point in time when a defendant
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, University of Maine School of Law. The author would like to thank
Professor Deirdre Smith for her helpful insights and guidance in developing this Note, the Maine Law
Review editors and staff for their assistance throughout the editing process, and her family and friends
for their support.
1. See, e.g., State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106; State v. Bryant, 2014 ME 94, 97 A.3d
595; State v. Lowe, 2013 ME 92, 81 A.3d 360; State v. Jones, 2012 ME 126, 55 A.3d 432; State v.
Dion, 2007 ME 87, 928 A.2d 746; State v. Higgins, 2002 ME 77, 796 A.2d 50. Per Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), persons must be read certain warnings prior to a custodial interrogation.
“An accused must be warned that he or she has the right to remain silent, that anything said can and will
be used against him or her in court, that he or she has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the
lawyer with him or her during interrogation, and that if he or she is indigent a lawyer will be appointed
to represent him or her.” 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1263 (2015).
2. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Constitution of the State
of Maine provides that “[t]he accused shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself
or herself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, property or privileges, but by judgment of that person’s peers
or the law of the land.” Me. Const. art. I § 6.
3. Dennis J. Braithwaite, Coerced Confessions, Harmless Error: The “Guilty as Hell” Rule in
State Courts, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 233, 233 (2013) (quoting Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann,
On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis,
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469 (1997)).
4. Id. at 233-34 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
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can make a meaningful, informed choice about whether or not to disclose selfincriminating information. Although the rights listed in these warnings may seem
obvious to some, research has indicated that there are misconceptions about the
extent to which people understand their rights and the content of Miranda
warnings. In a recent study, researchers set out to determine the extent to which
“members of the American public possess a working knowledge of their Miranda
rights.”5 Researchers asked several hundred participants to freely recall a Miranda
warning and fill out quizzes about Miranda’s protections.6 The results indicated
that only 54.3 percent of the participants were deemed “knowledgeable” about the
basic components of Miranda warnings, and “more than two thirds of the
[participants] misbelieved that Miranda applied in noncustodial situations.”7 The
results of this study are indicative of the importance of reading Miranda warnings
to suspects as a reminder of the rights afforded to them by the Constitution, as the
content of these warnings is not necessarily common knowledge.
There is an important limitation to the scope of Miranda’s protection.
Confessions obtained during a custodial interrogation are usually inadmissible at
trial unless the suspect was Mirandized.8 However, if a suspect is not legally “in
custody” during an interview or interrogation, there is no requirement that the
suspect have been read Miranda warnings.9 In such situations, any confessions
may be used at trial against a defendant to prove guilt, even if the defendant
declines to testify.10
After a brief review of Miranda, this Note will examine the method used by
Maine courts to determine whether a person is legally considered “in custody,”
which is predicated upon ten factors related to the circumstances of a person’s
interview or interrogation.11 This Note will then explore how the Law Court
applied these factors in its 2014 opinion in State v. Kittredge.12 After providing a
critique of the Law Court’s analysis in Kittredge, this Note will argue that Maine’s
ten-factor test may lead to inconsistent results in determining whether an interview
is or is not custodial and should thus be reexamined to ensure more consistent
custodial determinations in future cases. Potential remedies for the test could
include implementing a more thorough, extensive review of each of the ten factors
in every case, rather than focusing on just one or a few factors; reintroducing a
5. Richard Rogers et. al., General Knowledge and Misknowledge of Miranda Rights: Are Effective
Miranda Advisements Still Necessary? 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 432, 434 (2013) (citations
omitted).
6. Id. at 435. Participants were a diverse, educated group of individuals randomly drawn from the
Dallas County, Texas, jury pool, which researchers created by combining the State’s driver’s license list
and voter registration list. Id.
7. Id. at 436-37.
8. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
9. See id. The Court in Miranda supports its holding by reasoning that “when an individual is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities, the privilege against selfincrimination is jeopardized.” Id. Thus, the need for “procedural safeguards”—Miranda warnings—is
only implicated by a custodial interrogation and is not necessary in a noncustodial situation.
10. This was the case in Kittredge. The defendant, Karl Kittredge, declined to testify, but the
officer who obtained his confession testified under a hearsay exception as to the information Kittredge
disclosed to him. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ ¶ 11-12, 97 A.3d 106.
11. State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222.
12. 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106.
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defendant-specific factor to the “in custody” analysis, such as the subjective intent
of the officer or the subjective belief of the defendant as to whether or not he or she
is in custody during an interview; or, implementing a policy that incentivizes the
recording of interviews with suspects to ensure that important facts about the
circumstances of an interrogation are correctly relayed to the Law Court and
considered when applying the ten-factor test. Ultimately, Maine’s test should be
revisited to ensure that it provides adequate protection of a person’s right to avoid
self-incrimination when applied.
II. A REVIEW OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court decided one of its most important
cases: Miranda v. Arizona.13 In Miranda, a man named Ernesto Miranda was
arrested and taken into custody at a police station in Phoenix, Arizona.14 He was
brought to an interrogation room where he was questioned by two police officers.15
After about two hours, the officers had obtained a signed, written confession from
Miranda.16 The statement he signed included a paragraph stating that his
“confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and
with full knowledge of [his] legal rights, understanding any statement [he made]
may be used against [him].”17 At his jury trial, Miranda’s written confession was
admitted as evidence over the defense counsel’s objection, and the officers who
interrogated him testified that he made an oral confession as well.18 A jury found
Miranda guilty of rape and kidnapping.19 The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed
the conviction on appeal, holding there was no violation of Miranda’s
constitutional rights when his confession was obtained.20
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.21 The Court found that Miranda
was never informed of his right to consult with a lawyer or to have a lawyer present
during the police interrogation.22 Further, the Court determined that Miranda’s
right to avoid self-incrimination was “not effectively protected in any other
manner.”23 For these reasons, the Court held that Miranda’s statements were
inadmissible.24 In its holding, the Court explained that “the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural

13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); CNN Library, Top U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Fast Facts, CNN (June
21, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/21/us/top-u-s-supreme-court-decisions-fast-facts/;
Landmark Supreme Court Cases, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/educationalresources/get-informed/supreme-court/landmark-supreme-court-cases.aspx.
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 491-92.
17. Id. at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”25 The
Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.”26
Prior to Miranda, statements were only deemed inadmissible upon a showing
that they were obtained by “techniques and methods offensive to due process” or in
situations when it was clear that the suspect was unable to exercise “a free and
unconstrained will.”27 Following Miranda, the new procedural safeguards require
that “[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed.”28 The Miranda decision stands for the proposition that many
previously admissible statements must now be suppressed because of the
presumption “that statements made while in custody and without adequate
warnings were protected by the Fifth Amendment.”29
The Court justified these new requirements by reasoning that “[t]he Fifth
Amendment is . . . fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the
expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege [is]
simple.”30 Further, it said that courts may merely speculate as to a defendant’s
personal characteristics or feelings that contribute to an assumption that he or she is
in custody, but “a warning is a clear-cut fact . . . and a warning at the time of the
interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and insure that the
individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.”31
However, while the Court noted the “recurrent argument . . . that society’s need for
interrogation outweighs the privilege [of a person to remain silent],”32 it explained
that the “limits [it had] placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an
undue interference” with the job of law enforcement because the “decision does not
in any way preclude police from carrying out their traditional investigatory
functions.”33 In a later case, the Court reiterated that “[Miranda’s] safeguards were
not intended to ‘create a constitutional straightjacket,’ but rather to provide
practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.”34

25. Id. at 444.
26. Id.
27. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1940).
28. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court also explains that a person may waive these rights
“provided that waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id. Further, if a person
requests to speak with an attorney at any point during an interrogation the questioning must stop, and the
fact that a person “answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering” further questions until speaking with an attorney. Id.
at 444-45.
29. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985).
30. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
31. Id. at 468-69.
32. Id. at 479.
33. Id. at 481.
34. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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III. DETERMINING IF A SUSPECT IS “IN CUSTODY”
An important feature of Miranda warnings is that they are only required for
statements made during custodial interrogations, so an individual must be legally
“in custody” to receive their benefit.35 The Supreme Court has emphasized on
many occasions that determining if a suspect is “in custody” is an objective, not
subjective, analysis.36 There are two key inquiries essential to this determination:
first, evaluating the circumstances surrounding the interview or interrogation; and
second, deciding if a reasonable person under those circumstances would have felt
he or she could terminate the interrogation.37 Ultimately, the determinative
question is whether the person was subject to “a formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”38 The
Supreme Court did not list specific circumstances to consider when making this
determination, instead requiring courts and police officers to “examine all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including those that would have
affected how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would perceive his or
her freedom to leave.”39 Recent cases have clarified that this inquiry is inherently
objective,40 and the subjective views or mindset of the police officers or of the
person being questioned are irrelevant and not to be considered.41
In Maine, the Law Court has developed its own objective test to determine
whether a suspect is in custody.42 Similar to the United States Supreme Court’s
standard, the basic principle of Maine’s test is that “an interrogation is custodial if
‘a reasonable person standing in the shoes of [the defendant] would have felt he or
she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’”43 The Law Court
has developed a non-exhaustive list of ten factors for courts to consider in making
this determination:
(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements;
(2) the party who initiated the contact;
(3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent
communicated to the defendant);
(4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant,
to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant’s position
would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the
extent the officer’s response would affect how a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
(6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would perceive it);
(7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
36. J.D.B. v. North Carolina 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011).
37. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
38. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
39. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)).
42. See State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222.
43. State v. Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 22, 55 A.3d 432 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Prescott, 2012 ME 96, ¶ 10, 48 A.3d 218).
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(8) the number of law enforcement officers present;
(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and
44
(10) the duration and character of the interrogation.

Courts are to “consider these factors ‘in their totality, not in isolation.’”45
Essentially, a court must “weigh” these factors to determine if a person is in
custody.46
The Law Court first presented these factors as a group in 1998 in State v.
Michaud.47 The test developed as a compilation of factors from prior state and
federal circuit court decisions, which have changed substantially over the years:
earlier “in custody” tests considered several subjective factors, including the
subjective intent of the law enforcement officer(s) and the subjective beliefs of a
suspect or defendant.
In State v. Inman,48 one of Maine’s earliest post-Miranda cases that dealt with
a dispute as to whether an interview was or was not custodial, the Law Court relied
on case law from several jurisdictions in determining what facts should be
considered in the custody analysis.49 These factors included whether the defendant
was restrained when questioned,50 the “tone and technique” of the interrogation,51
the location where the questioning took place,52 whether there was probable cause
for arrest,53 and the subjective intent of the police.54 A few years later the Law
Court presented revised criteria for determining whether an individual is in
custody, explaining that consideration may be given to where statements were
made, which party initiated the contact, the existence of probable cause for arrest,
the subjective views of the police, the subjective belief of the suspect, and the
investigation’s focus.55
In 1985, in State v. Thibodeau, these six factors were confirmed by the Court
as the proper criteria to consider in a custodial analysis.56 Just one year later,
however, the subjective criteria from Thibodeau were abandoned in State v.
Gardner.57 In that case, the Court explained that courts should consider whether
the suspect was questioned in a place with which he or she was familiar, the
number of law enforcement officers present during the interrogation, the amount of
physical restraint exercised against the suspect, the duration of the interrogation,
and its character.58 The ten-factor test adopted by the Michaud Court derived in
44. Id. (quoting Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222).
45. Id. (quoting Prescott, 2012 ME 96, ¶ 11, 48 A.3d 218).
46. See State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 18, 97 A.3d 106 (explaining that “several factors weigh
against a finding of custody” when analyzing the factors).
47. 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222.
48. 350 A.2d 582 (Me. 1976).
49. Id. at 598.
50. Id. (citing United States v. Akin, 435 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1970)).
51. Id. (citing People v. Arnold, 426 P.2d 515 (Cal. 1967)).
52. Id. (citing Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968)).
53. Id. (citing United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970)).
54. Id.
55. State v. Cochran, 425 A.2d 999 (Me. 1981) (citing Montos, 421 F.2d at 223).
56. 496 A.2d 635, 640-41 (Me. 1985).
57. 509 A.2d 1160 (Me. 1986).
58. Id. at 1163 (citing United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 961 n.13 (1st Cir. 1986)).
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part from these earlier cases59 and from Stansbury v. California—a 1994 United
States Supreme Court case expressly stating that “the initial determination of
custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being
questioned.”60
The ten factors from Michaud are regularly considered by Maine courts to
determine whether a defendant is in custody and often lead to courtroom dispute.61
Issues arise regarding whether or not certain factors are satisfied and how
circumstances surrounding an interview contribute to whether a person was “in
custody.” The case of State v. Kittredge62 is an example of when such a dispute led
to litigation.
IV. THE “IN CUSTODY” TEST IN STATE V. KITTREDGE
A. Facts of the Case
In State v. Kittredge, the Law Court considered a challenge to a trial court’s
denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress self-incriminating statements made in
the absence of Miranda warnings.63 The defendant, Karl Kittredge, confessed to
his involvement in a burglary during an interview with police and was found guilty
by a jury after a trial in which he did not testify, but his statements were admitted
as evidence against him.64
The facts, as recited by the Law Court in its opinion, were as follows:
sometime in early 2012, Kittredge had installed a safe in a bedroom belonging to
his wife’s friend, Vicki Lachance,65 so that she could store her prescription
medications and other valuable items in a secure place.66 At the time, Kittredge
was on probation because he pled guilty to several counts of theft and burglary in
2008.67 On June 11, Ms. Lachance complained of a headache and Kittredge’s wife
took her to the hospital.68 After his wife left, Kittredge had a discussion with his
adult son, Karl Kittredge Jr. (Karl Jr.), and his friend, Patty Raymond,69 about the
59. Both Thibodeau and Gardner are cited to for support of the factors in Michaud. State v.
Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222.
60. 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994).
61. See supra note 1.
62. 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106.
63. Id. ¶ 1. In addition to challenging the denial of his motion to suppress a confessions, the
defendant also appealed on the grounds that the court “improperly presented to the jury an uncharged
count of theft by receiving stolen property” and that there was insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for this charge. Id. This note will only review the portions of the case relevant to the
challenge of the motion to suppress.
64. Id.
65. While the Law Court did not use the victim’s name in its opinion, names of the victim and
others involved were referenced in the recitation of facts in the briefs filed by appellant and appellee.
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1, State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106 (No. Ken-13-439)
[hereinafter Blue Br.]; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 2, State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, 97 A.3d 106
(No. Ken-13-439) [hereinafter Red Br.].
66. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 2, 97 A.3d 106.
67. Id. ¶ 3.
68. Id.
69. See supra note 65.
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fact that Ms. Lachance had certain medications at her house.70 Karl Jr. left to go to
an undisclosed destination and later called Kittredge and Ms. Raymond on the
phone requesting that they pick him up.71 When Kittredge and Ms. Raymond
stopped to pick up Karl Jr. in a vacant lot near Ms. Lachance’s house, Kittredge
saw that his son had a bag with Ms. Lachance’s safe in it.72 Kittredge then drove to
his mother’s house and took some of the pills that were in the safe.73
When Ms. Lachance arrived back home, she saw that the safe was missing.74
She had more than $1,000 worth of “medications, including oxycodone, jewelry,
and cash” in the safe.75 There was a video surveillance system in Ms. Lachance’s
home, but the tape had been removed.76 Kittredge had known that her home had a
surveillance system because he had seen the cameras during a visit.77
On August 16, 2012, Kittredge went to meet with his probation officer at the
officer’s request.78 The meeting took place in the probation office.79 Two state
troopers, armed and in uniform, met Kittredge when he arrived and the three of
them went into a room and sat down.80 As described in the Law Court’s opinion,
the state troopers informed Kittredge that he was not under arrest but that they
wanted to talk with him about something that had happened at Ms. Lachance’s
residence.81 Neither of the troopers read Miranda warnings to Kittredge.82 The
door to the room was closed but unlocked; Kittredge knew that he was able to leave
the room, but he was not sure that he would be permitted to leave the building he
was in.83 There was a tape recorder in the room, but the interview was not recorded
for unknown reasons.84
The troopers told Kittredge that they knew he was involved in the incident
based on comments from others, but Kittredge denied any involvement.85 The
troopers told Kittredge several times that another witness gave them information
that led them to believe Kittredge was not telling the truth.86 Kittredge eventually
“broke down and said ‘that friggen son of mine,’” and made self-incriminating
statements.87 The trial court found that the troopers did not make any promises to
70. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 4, 97 A.3d 106.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. ¶ 5.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. The Law Court does not indicate in its opinion why this meeting was called, but
Kittredge’s brief explains that Ms. Lachance “came under a belief that [Kittredge’s son] had been
involved with the taking of her safe” and that “[t]his belief motivated the investigating officers to
attempt to interrogate [Kittredge] about the safe.” Blue Br. at 4.
79. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 7, 97 A.3d 106.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. ¶ 8.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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Kittredge, but told him that he “should cooperate because it might help him with
the district attorney’s office” and that “it was best to tell the truth.”88 Additionally,
the troopers did not make any threats, physically restrain Kittredge in any way, or
“make threatening gestures.”89 The interview lasted forty-five to sixty minutes,90
and when the questioning concluded, Kittredge left the office.91
Kittredge was charged with burglary and theft by unauthorized taking or
transfer in November 2012 and was indicted in January 2013.92 He filed a motion
to suppress the statements he made at the probation office,93 but his motion was
denied.94 The trial court held that “Kittredge spoke voluntarily and that Miranda
warnings were not required because Kittredge was not in custody.”95 A two-daylong jury trial on the charges was held in August 2013.96 One of the state troopers
who was at the interview with Kittredge testified that “Kittredge admitted to him
that he had picked up his son, had driven to his mother’s house . . . had seen the
victim’s safe inside his son’s duffel bag, and had taken oxycodone pills from the
safe.”97 Kittredge exercised his right not to testify.98 The jury found Kittredge not
guilty of burglary, but guilty of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer of property
that it determined was worth more than $1,000.99 Kittredge was subsequently
sentenced to five years in prison, with all but forty-two months suspended,
followed by a two-year probation period and an obligation to pay $3,975.99 in
restitution to the victim.100 Kittredge appealed.101
B. Arguments on Appeal
In Kittredge’s brief, he addressed each of the ten Michaud factors and applied
them to the circumstances of his interrogation to argue that he was in custody
during his interview at the probation office. 102 He argued that the trial court erred
88. Id. ¶ 9.
89. Id.
90. Id. ¶ 8.
91. Id. ¶ 9.
92. Id. ¶ 6. The burglary charge is a Class B crime under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 401(1)(A), (B)(4)
(2013). The theft by authorized taking or transfer is a Class C crime under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 353(1)(A),
(B)(4) (2013). In addition to these charges, a motion to revoke Kittredge’s probation was filed by the
state. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 6, 97 A.3d 106. The motion to suppress filed by Kittredge was in
response to both the criminal charges and the motion for probation revocation. Id.
93. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 1, 97 A.3d 106.
94. Id. ¶ 10.
95. Id.
96. Id. ¶ 11.
97. Id.
98. Id. ¶ 12.
99. Id. ¶ 13. After it presented evidence, the State made a motion “for the court to instruct the jury
on a count for receiving stolen property as a lesser included offense.” Id. The State’s motion was
granted “because theft by receiving stolen property is an alternative basis for a theft charge and is
subject to consolidation pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 351 (2013).” Id.
100. Id. ¶ 14.
101. Id.
102. Blue Br. at 7-14. The brief was accompanied by a Rule 19 memorandum requesting that the
Court allow Kittredge to appeal from his probation revocation, as his probation was revoked upon the
jury finding him guilty of theft. Id. at 1.
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in its denial of his motion to suppress because “[e]very single prong of the
aforementioned [ten-factor] test [was] a positive result for custodial
interrogation.”103 Some of the assertions he made to support his contention were:
“the trial court found that [Kittredge] did not feel at liberty to leave”;104 that
Kittredge was called into his probation office—a law enforcement setting—by his
probation officer but was directed to a room where police officers were waiting for
him, which contributes to the custodial setting and the party who initiated the
contact;105 the officers made it clear to Kittredge that he was being investigated and
the officers accused him of lying, which contributes to the existence of probable
cause to arrest;106 “the police clearly and plainly manifested to [Kittredge] that he
was not free to leave” and that “a reasonable person in [Kittredge]’s position would
not feel free to leave”;107 he was not in familiar surroundings and that a police
station or probation office is “the opposite of a familiar surrounding” for an
ordinary person;108 there was no reason to have two officers present aside from
creating “an environment of intimidation”;109 and “the interrogation went on and on
until the officers were able to break [Kittredge] down,” lending to the character of
the interview.110
The State, in its brief, also used the ten-factor test as the basis for determining
whether the interview was custodial.111 It asserted that the trial court correctly
determined that Kittredge was not in custody for a number of reasons:
The officers told Kittredge that he was not under arrest; [t]he interview lasted 45
minutes to an hour; [o]nly two officers were present during the interview; [t]he
officers made no threats, promises, or inducements to Kittredge; [t]here were no
physical restraints of any kind used on Kittredge; Kittredge drove himself to his
probation office; Kittredge was seated in a conference room in his probation office
next to a door that was unlocked with respect to him; Kittredge was very polite
and very cooperative throughout the interview; Kittredge . . . did not suffer any
kind of incapacitating emotional or mental health meltdown during the interview;
[t]he officers did not communicate to Kittredge that they had probable cause to
arrest him; [t]he officers did not tell Kittredge that he was the focus of their
112
investigation.

To support its contentions, the State cited a recent Law Court case, State v.
Poblete,113 which held that an interview is not custodial even when it takes place at
a police station;114 there was little discussion of the other factual circumstances that
the State cited as support for its contention that the interview was not custodial.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
Blue Br. at 9-10 (citing State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222).
Id. at 10-11.
2010 ME 37, 993 A.2d 1104.
Id. ¶ 23.
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C. The Law Court’s Decision
In affirming the trial court’s denial of Kittredge’s motion to suppress, the Law
Court noted that because it was clear that Kittredge was subject to interrogation its
review of the case would focus on the question of whether Kittredge was in custody
during the interrogation.115 The Court considers this determination a question of
both fact and law, giving deference to the trial court’s factual findings, but
reviewing de novo whether a person was legally in custody.116 In such cases, the
question presented is whether the trial court’s findings of fact “‘demonstrate as a
matter of law that a reasonable person in [the defendant]’s situation would have felt
he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation.’”117 The ten factors
presented in Michaud are what the Court traditionally considers when making this
determination.118
At the beginning of its analysis of whether Kittredge was in custody, the Law
Court stated that:
[S]everal factors weigh against a finding of custody: the troopers told Kittredge
that he was not under arrest; Kittredge did not manifest any belief that he was not
free to leave; he was in a familiar building that he had been in before, though not
necessarily in that particular room; only two law enforcement officers were
present during the interview; he was under no physical restraint; and the
interrogation only lasted forty-five minutes to one hour in an unlocked room
119
without any additional coercive conditions.

The Court also listed factors that weighed in favor of a finding that Kittredge
was in custody:
Kittredge made the statements at the probation office where he was required to
report; his probation officer—not he—initiated the contact; and the troopers
communicated to Kittredge that they had information suggesting that he was
120
involved in a crime, which suggested that he was a focus of the investigation.

The Law Court then began to analyze the factors. The bulk of the Law Court’s
discussion focused on the fact that Kittredge’s probation officer had called him to
come to the probation office.121 Citing as authority several cases from the United
States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions,122 the Court concluded “that the
State’s exercise of its authority” in requiring Kittredge, or any probationer, to
appear at his probation office “does not, standing alone, place the probationer in
custody” for purposes of Miranda.123 The Court continued by pointing out that
115. State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 17, 97 A.3d 106.
116. Id. (citing State v. Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶ 13, 81 A.3d 360).
117. Id. (quoting Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶ 14, 81 A.3d 360).
118. Id. See also State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222 (recounting the “Michaud
factors”).
119. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 18, 97 A.3d 106 (citations omitted).
120. Id.
121. Id. ¶ 19.
122. The Law Court cited to the following three cases in its analysis: Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.
420 (1984); United States v. Cranley, 350 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2003); State v. Scott, 765 N.E.2d 930
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
123. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 22, 97 A.3d 106.
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“that the few factors that weigh in favor of a finding of custody are insufficient,
without more, to establish that Kittredge was in custody.”124 The Court explained:
Although Kittredge was called in by his probation officer upon suspicion of
criminal conduct and was met by two troopers who wanted to interview him, the
troopers told him that he was not under arrest, he subjectively realized that he
could leave the room, he ultimately left without arrest, the interview was held in a
building that was familiar to Kittredge, he was not physically restrained, he was
not threatened in any way, the door was unlocked, only two troopers questioned
125
him, and they concluded the interview within forty-five minutes to one hour.

The Court did not, however, go into detail about the significance of these
factors. Because the Court determined that Kittredge was not in custody, Miranda
warnings were not necessary, and the trial court was not required to suppress his
incriminating statements.126
The Court then considered whether Kittredge’s statements were voluntary, as
statements or confessions are not admissible in court unless made voluntarily—
even if they were not made in the context of a custodial interrogation.127
Voluntariness must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.128 A
confession is considered voluntary if it is made by the “free choice of a rational
mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the
circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair.”129
In Kittredge, the primary issue relating to voluntariness was whether an
“impermissible offer of leniency” had occurred when the troopers told Kittredge
that he “should cooperate because it might help him with the district attorney’s
office.”130 The Law Court reviewed previous cases in which statements were found
not to be impermissible offers of leniency131 and ultimately concluded that the
statements made to Kittredge were “vague and generalized” and were not
impermissible. As such, the trial court did not err in finding that Kittredge’s
statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.132
D. Analysis
In its opinion, the Law Court seemed to accept the State’s succinct list of
reasons supporting the conclusion that Kittredge was not in custody. A puzzling

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. ¶ 23.
127. See id. ¶ 24 (citing State v. Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶¶ 20-21, 81 A.3d 360).
128. State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 11, 748 A.2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (noting the Court’s
holding that “no out-of-court statement of a defendant may be used against that defendant unless the
State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary”).
129. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 25, 97 A.3d 106 (citations omitted).
130. Id. ¶ 27.
131. Statements that the court previously held not to constitute impermissible offers of leniency are:
“[t]he more cooperative you are, the better things are for you,” State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 57, 1
A.3d 445; if the defendant confessed, it would “look better,” State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 34, 928 A.2d
746; an officer telling a defendant with whom he was an acquaintance, “I’m with you,” State v.
Schueler, 488 A.2d 481, 484 (Me. 1985).
132. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 28, 97 A.3d 106.
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aspect of the Law Court’s analysis in Kittredge, however, is its brief, nonexhaustive application of the ten Michaud factors. The Court only considered one
aspect of the situation in depth—the fact that Kittredge’s probation officer
requested that he come to the probation office—to support its conclusion that
Kittredge was not in custody.133
Further, the cases that the Law Court used to support its conclusion are
distinguishable from Kittredge’s case. The Law Court cited the United States
Supreme Court’s opinion in Minnesota v. Murphy, a case factually similar to
Kittredge in that a probation officer requested a meeting with the defendant after
learning about possible criminal activity.134 During the meeting, the defendant
made self-incriminating statements in the absence of Miranda warnings.135 In that
case, however, the probation officer conducted the meeting alone; no police
officers were present.136 The Minnesota Supreme Court barred the defendant’s
confession because it determined that a probation officer may be able to coerce or
“compel [a defendant’s] attendance and truthful answers.”137 The United States
Supreme Court disagreed. On appeal, the Court found that the fact that the
interview took place at probation office made the interview less coercive because
an interview conducted by a person’s probation officer “subjected [the defendant]
to less intimidating pressure than is imposed on grand jury witnesses.”138 Unlike
the interview in Murphy, Kittredge’s interview was not conducted by his lesscoercive probation officer—it was conducted by two armed state troopers. This
fact makes the Murphy case substantially different from Kittredge, and thus less
persuasive as precedent.
Similarly, in State v. Scott,139 an Ohio appeals court case cited by the Law
Court, a probation officer asked a defendant to come to the probation office where
he was subsequently interviewed by a sheriff.140 The sheriff told the defendant that
he was not under arrest and he would be free to leave after the interview.141 After
approximately fifteen minutes, the defendant expressed that he may have been
involved in criminal activity, and at that point, the sheriff read him Miranda rights
and began to record the rest of the interview.142 The court concluded that the
defendant “was not formally arrested nor was there any restraint on his freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest” when he made his initial

133. Concededly, the Law Court noted that it focused on this issue because the trial court did.
However, as noted earlier, the Law Court’s standard of review for in custody determinations is de novo,
so it accepts the trial court’s findings of fact to make a de novo decision about whether the facts add up
to an “in custody” finding.
134. 465 U.S. 420, 423 (1984).
135. Id. at 424-25.
136. See id. at 429 n.5 (The situation would be different “if [the defendant] had been interviewed by
the police themselves . . . .”); see also id. at 432 (explaining that [the defendant] was not surprised that
his remarks made at the interview with the probation officer “would be made available to the police”
later on).
137. Id. at 431.
138. Id.
139. 765 N.E.2d 930 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
140. Id. at 932.
141. Id. at 936.
142. Id. at 932.
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statements, so “he was not entitled to Miranda warnings” at that point.143 Like
Murphy, this case is substantially different from Kittredge. In Scott, the unMirandized portion of the interview was short, and the defendant was read Miranda
rights as soon as he began to make incriminating statements. Kittredge was not
read Miranda rights at any time during his interview with his probation officer.
The Law Court nonetheless used these cases to establish that, by itself, the fact
that Kittredge’s interview took place at his probation officer’s office did not
indicate that Kittredge was in custody during the interview. Not only were those
cases readily distinguishable from Kittredge, but the Law Court failed to give much
consideration to any of the other ten factors from Michaud. Courts are supposed to
consider the factors “in their totality, not [in] isolation.”144 What makes the
analysis even more difficult is that there is not yet any explicit guidance or
explanation as to how the ten factors should be weighed against each other or
considered as a group. Regarding the interview taking place in the probation
office, even the case law the Law Court relied on did not examine how much
weight to give to that fact in the context of other factors. As it currently stands, the
“in custody” test and analysis used by the Law Court leave substantial room for
potentially inconsistent results when applied.
An example of such an inconsistency is present in State v. Lowe, another
recent Law Court decision involving a motion to suppress a confession, where the
Court applied the factors to statements a suspect made to a state trooper while in a
hospital.145 In that case, an eighteen-year-old girl named Kristina Lowe and three
others were taken to the hospital after being involved in a single-car accident.146
Soon after Lowe arrived, a police officer who was armed and in uniform requested
to interview her about the accident.147 After questioning began, the trooper took a
five-minute break and learned that two people had died in the accident and that
Lowe was suspected to have been the driver of the car.148 Questioning resumed,
and Lowe made incriminating statements without first being Mirandized.149 As in
Kittredge, the Law Court recited the ten Michaud factors as what it would consider
in determining whether the statements were made in a custodial situation.150 In its
analysis in Lowe, the Court first stated that the trial court was correct in
determining that hospitalization did not create a custodial situation on its own.151
However, the Court determined that Lowe was in custody for several other reasons:
the trooper had acquired information during the break that made the girl a suspect
in a criminal case; the questioning was “focused, aggressive, and insistent;” the
trooper urged Lowe to tell the truth; and the trooper failed to repeatedly tell Lowe
that she was free to stop answering questions.152 The Court held that “[v]iewed
143. Id. at 936.
144. State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 17, 97 A.3d 106 (quoting State v. Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶ 16,
81 A.3d 360).
145. 2013 ME 92, ¶ 19, 81 A.3d 360.
146. Id. ¶ 3.
147. Id. ¶ 5.
148. Id. ¶¶ 6-8.
149. Id. ¶ 8.
150. Id. ¶ 16.
151. Id. ¶ 19.
152. Id.
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objectively, the information that the trooper learned over the break [in questioning]
and communicated to Lowe produced a change in [her] liberty to end the
interview” and concluded that “[a] reasonable person in [her] position would not
have felt at liberty to end the interrogation.”153 Therefore, the Court determined
that Lowe was in custody when she made statements to the police.154
Inconsistency is present here because several of the circumstances that the
Court determined had created a custodial interrogation in Lowe were present in
Kittredge as well: the troopers had reason to suspect that Kittredge was involved in
a crime and they expressed this belief to Kittredge; they told Kittredge that they did
not believe he was telling the truth; the questioning was direct and focused; and the
law enforcement officer had initiated the contact.155 Furthermore, additional
factors were present in Kittredge that were not present in Lowe: there was not one,
but two fully uniformed police officers present during Kittredge’s questioning; he
was in a place associated with law enforcement; and, he was unsure he would be
allowed to leave the building he was in.156 Notwithstanding these seemingly
important parallels between the two cases, the Law Court came to two different
results: Lowe’s interrogation was custodial; Kittredge’s was not.157
V. REVISITING MAINE’S “IN CUSTODY” TEST
The different results in these two cases demonstrate that the ten-factor test
from State v. Michaud is being applied inconsistently and may lead to different
determinations of whether an interview is custodial in similar situations. The test
purports to be objective, but the benefits of an objective test are lost without more
guidance and consistency in its application. Several measures could be taken to
achieve this result.
A. More Thorough Consideration of the Ten Factors
In the Law Court’s analysis of the Michaud factors in Kittredge’s case, there
was no explanation or cited precedent that indicated how the factors should be
weighed against each other to determine whether an interview is custodial. The
Court identified circumstances that both supported and refuted a finding that
Kittredge was not in custody, but did not expressly explain the weight or
importance of these factors.
In their briefs, Kittredge and the State had conflicting arguments regarding
what factual circumstances should have been considered when the Law Court
reviewed the trial court’s custody determination on appeal.158 It is possible that the

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Blue Br. at 9-13; Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶¶ 7-8, 97 A.3d 106.
156. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 7, 97 A.3d 106.
157. While the Law Court cited to Lowe in the Kittredge opinion, the citation was general and there
was no attempt to distinguish the cases.
158. Kittredge’s brief analyzes each of the ten factors individually, making an argument that the
circumstances weigh in favor of a finding of custody. Blue Br. at 9-13. The State lists factual
circumstances that indicate the defendant was not in custody during his interview and provides a brief
analysis for fewer factors. See Red Br. at 10-13.
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Court could have reached a different conclusion if it had placed more weight on
certain other circumstances of Kittredge’s interview, such as “the party who
initiated the contact,” the “existence . . . of probable cause to arrest (to the extent
communicated to the defendant),” the subjective views that the police manifested to
the defendant, the investigation’s focus, “the number of law enforcement officers
present,” and the “duration and character of the interrogation.”159 As the Law
Court recognized, the facts indicated that the probation officer requested the
interview, the police had reason to suspect Kittredge of a crime and made him
aware of this information, there was more than one state trooper present, and
Kittredge was likely the focus of the investigation—all factors that weigh in favor
of a finding that he was in custody.160 While the Law Court recognized these facts,
it nonetheless placed nearly all of its emphasis on the fact that the interview took
place at the request and location of the probation officer.161
Under the Court’s self-imposed charge to consider these factors “in their
totality, not in isolation,”162 the Law Court should have conducted a more thorough
analysis of the circumstances of Kittredge’s interview or weighed the factual
findings against one another more evenly to determine if a finding of custody was
warranted. If the Court had more completely examined the applicability to each of
the ten Michaud factors to the factual circumstances in its de novo review of the
trial court’s decision,163 it may have come to a different conclusion about whether
or not Kittredge was “in custody” when he made his incriminating statements.
B. Returning a Subjective Factor to the Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that determining
whether a suspect is in custody for the purpose of Miranda warnings is a
fundamentally objective analysis.164 While simpler to administer, a purely
objective test fails to take into account certain circumstances, such as the personal
characteristics or feelings of an individual, which may affect whether or not that
person feels free to leave the interview—the crux of the objective test.165 Coercive
tactics may often be used in interviews and interrogations with suspects and
defendants;166 law enforcement officers are specially trained on how to speak with
suspects and obtain confessions in ways that are legal, yet focused and
aggressive.167 Police interrogations are designed to be “psychologically oriented,”
taking place in rooms that isolate the suspect and make him or her
159. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 17, 97 A.3d 106 (quoting Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶ 16, 81 A.3d 360).
160. Id. ¶ 18.
161. See id. ¶¶ 18-23.
162. Id. ¶ 17 (citing Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶ 16, 81 A.3d 360).
163. Id. ¶ 15 (“We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to factual issues and de
novo as to issues of law. . . .”) (citation omitted).
164. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (“[T]he initial determination of custody
depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation . . . .”).
165. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 17, 97 A.3d 106 (“[T]he question is whether [the] facts demonstrate
. . . that a reasonable person in [the defendant]’s situation would have felt he or she was at liberty to
terminate the interrogation.”) (third alteration in original) (citations omitted).
166. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE
PUB. INT. 2, 41 (2004).
167. See infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
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uncomfortable.168 One modern interrogation method, called the Reid technique,
dictates a nine-step process for police to use when questioning a suspect.169 The
purpose of the process, as explained by experts in the field of psychology, is “to get
suspects to incriminate themselves by increasing the anxiety associated with denial,
plunging them into a state of despair, and minimizing the perceived consequences
of confession.”170 This type of pressure could impact an individual’s perception of
whether they are free to leave an interrogation in a way that may not necessarily be
captured by an exclusively objective test.
A entirely subjective, case-by-case analysis is not likely feasible or desirable:
if a purely subjective analysis was employed, law enforcement officers would need
“to become de facto competency evaluators for custodial purposes . . . [which]
would probably not be in accordance with their particular skill set or primary
objective of apprehending unlawful individuals.”171 However, the addition of a
defendant-specific factor, such as the subjective intent of the interviewing officer or
the subjective belief of the defendant as to whether he or she was in custody, into
the analysis could be a workable, fair alternative to the purely objective “in
custody” test. In Kittredge, for example, the trial court found as fact that Kittredge
did not know whether he was free to leave the building172 and that the state troopers
had information that made them believe Kittredge was involved in the crime prior
to interviewing him.173 If considered by the Court, both of these facts could have
tipped the scales in favor of a finding that Kittredge was in custody. Although
subjective factors were abandoned in favor of the simplicity of an objective test,174
it is certainly feasible that some consideration of the officer’s intent or the
defendant’s actual knowledge and belief be added back into the custodial
analysis.175
In fact, a defendant-specific factor infiltrated the purely objective approach to
custody determinations at the United States Supreme Court level in a recent case,

168. Kassin, supra note 166, at 42 (citation omitted).
169. Id. The nine-step Reid Technique includes the police developing themes of psychological
justification for the crime, refusing to accept a suspect’s denial, preventing a suspect from withdrawing,
showing sympathy, getting the suspect to remember details of the crime, and then making an oral or
written statement of guilt. Id. at 42-43.
170. Id. at 43.
171. Tobias Wasser & Laurel Edwards, Mentally Ill in Police Custody: Subjective Standard Denied,
41 LEGAL DIG. 121, 122 (2013).
172. State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 7, 97 A.3d 106.
173. Id. ¶ 8.
174. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994).
175. Illinois case law provides a good example of how a subjective factor may be integrated in to the
analysis. To determine “whether an arrest has occurred and, therefore, whether a person is in custody,”
Illinois courts should consider the following factors: “(1) the time, place, length, mood, and mode of the
encounter between the defendant and the police; (2) the number of police officers present; (3) any
indicia of formal arrest or restraint, such as the use of handcuffs or drawing of guns; (4) the intention of
the officers; (5) the subjective belief or understanding of the defendant; (6) whether the defendant was
told he could refuse to accompany the police; (7) whether the defendant was transported in a police car;
(8) whether the defendant was told he was free to leave; (9) whether the defendant was told he was
under arrest; and (10) the language used by officers.” Ries v. City of Chicago, 919 N.E.2d 465, 475 (Ill.
App. 3d 2009).
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J.D.B. v. North Carolina.176 In that case, a thirteen-year-old seventh-grader,
J.D.B., was attending school and was taken from his classroom by a police officer
in uniform.177 He was brought to a conference room where he was questioned by
police for half an hour about some nearby break-ins in the neighborhood.178 The
questioning began with small talk, but J.D.B. confessed that he was involved in the
break-ins after learning that he could possibly go to a juvenile detention center.179
Prior to the questioning, he was not read Miranda warnings, did not have the
opportunity to talk with his grandmother (his caretaker), and was not told that he
was free to leave the room.180 The Supreme Court, in its opinion, recognized that
whether a suspect is in custody is an objective question.181 The Court explained
that using an objective test is helpful because it avoids burdening police with
having to anticipate a defendant’s “subjective state of mind” during an interview.182
However, the Court continued by saying that “[i]n some circumstances, a child’s
age ‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in the suspect’s position ‘would
perceive his or her freedom to leave.’”183 The Court said it has “observed that
children are generally less mature and responsible than adults; . . . they often lack
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them; and they are more vulnerable [than adults].”184
Therefore, the Court held that so long as a child’s age is known to an officer at the
time of questioning “or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable
officer,” age should be included as a factor in the custody analysis.185
Writing for the dissent, Justice Alito argued that the “[majority’s] decision
shifts the Miranda custody determination from a one-size-fits-all reasonable-person
test into an inquiry that must account for at least one individualized characteristic—
age—that is thought to correlate with susceptibility to coercive pressures . . . .”186
The dissent points out that other characteristics may affect a person’s susceptibility
to these pressures, which will lead to additional issues for the Court to resolve in
the future.187 To solve these problems, the dissent explained, the Court will then
have to “choose to limit today’s decision by arbitrarily distinguishing a suspect’s
age from other personal characteristics—such as intelligence, education,
occupation, or prior experience with law enforcement—that may also correlate
with susceptibility to coercive pressures” or “be forced to effect a fundamental
transformation of the Miranda custody test—from a clear, easily applied
prophylactic rule into a highly fact-intensive standard resembling the voluntariness
test that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory.”188 In sum, the dissenters in
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
Id. at 2399.
Id.
Id. at 2399-40.
Id. at 2399.
Id. at 2402.
Id.
Id. at 2402-03 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994)).
Id. at 2403.
Id. at 2406.
Id. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id.
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J.D.B. clearly believe that the door to the inclusion of other defendant-specific
factors has opened, and this case could provide support for courts to allow some
subjectivity to infiltrate the “in custody” test.
In Maine, court opinions prior to Michaud did consider the subjective intent of
the officer and the subjective beliefs of a suspect when determining if that person
was in custody.189 Whether or not these or other subjective circumstances will be
considered in future custody analyses remains to be seen.
Nonetheless,
incorporating a defendant-specific component back into the custodial test would
seem to be in sync with Maine’s past approach and could help provide results in a
custody determination that account for more of the circumstances surrounding an
interview and differences in individuals’ mental abilities and susceptibility to
interrogative pressures.
C. A Policy that Encourages Recording Interviews and Interrogations
Because the Law Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings to determine
de novo if a person was in custody during questioning,190 it is crucial that these
facts are accurate—especially facts that relate to whether a suspect was told he or
she was free to leave, not under arrest, or that express the tone of the interview, as
these factors can be indicative of whether an interview is or is not custodial under
the Michaud test.191 One way to ensure an accurate recitation of events could be to
encourage or require the recording of interviews and interrogations in order for
statements to be admissible in court. While there was a recorder in the room where
Kittredge was questioned, it was not recording the interview “for reasons that
[could not] be determined.”192 If it had been recording, the Law Court would have
known for certain the tone of the interview, the attitude of the officers, what the
officers told Kittredge about suspicions of his guilt, and other facts that the parties
characterized differently in their briefs that may have impacted its custody
determination.
Several states already have judicially created requirements to record
interrogations. In 1985, “the Alaska Supreme Court held that ‘an unexcused failure
to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention
violates a suspect’s right to due process’” according to the state constitution.193
Alaska was the first state to require that all custodial interrogations occurring in a
place of detention be recorded.194 While Alaska is the only state to have gone as
far as recognizing a due process right to the recording of interviews,195 courts in

189. See, e.g., State v. Thibodeau, 496 A.2d 635, 639 (Me. 1985); State v. Cochran, 425 A.2d 999,
1002 (Me. 1981).
190. State v. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 17, 97 A.3d 106 (citation omitted).
191. See State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 92, ¶ 4, 81 A.3d 360.
192. Kittredge, 2014 ME 90, ¶ 7, 97 A.3d 106.
193. Michael Kiel Kaiser, Wrongful Convictions: If Mandatory Recording is the Antidote, Are the
Side Effects Worth It? 67 ARK. L. REV. 167, 173 (2014) (quoting Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158
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Minnesota have followed suit by requiring that interviews be recorded.196 In both
states, “with some exceptions, the court would suppress products of an unrecorded
interview at trial.”197
In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court created recording
requirements, but it took a slightly different approach.198 Instead of automatically
excluding statements that have not been recorded, failure to electronically record a
custodial interrogation “entitles the suspect to a favorable jury instruction.”199
Later, in 2005, the New Jersey Supreme Court changed its court rules to require
that interrogations be recorded in all cases involving a violent crime,200 and in
2009, the Indiana Supreme Court mandated that interviews be recorded for all
felony cases via an amendment to the state’s rules of evidence.201
Maine is one of a handful of states that has a statutory recording requirement,
but the requirement is not all-inclusive.202 The statute currently only mandates that
law enforcement have policies in place regarding the recording of interviews with
suspects of “serious crimes” and that law enforcement preserve “investigative notes
and records in such cases.”203 Expanding the circumstances in which recordings
are required or adding an incentive to record interviews, such as a jury instruction
favoring the defendant, could help to ensure that courts are examining accurate
facts in cases involving custodial interrogations. There are many other benefits to
recording interviews as well: recordings create a permanent record of what
occurred during an interview, including how officers treated the suspect being
interviewed; motions to suppress statements based on police coercion are easily
resolved by listening to the recorded interview; and the public’s confidence in the
police and their practices increases because the recordings show that they have
nothing to hide.204 Further, as evidenced in research collected by a lawyer, police
officers, sheriffs, and prosecutors have indicated that a policy of recording
interviews does not affect the police’s ability to obtain admissions in most
instances.205
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1162; State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 173-74 (citing Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533 (Mass. 2004)).
The jury instruction informs the jury “that the State’s highest court has expressed a preference that such
interrogations be recorded whenever practicable” and “that, because of the absence of any recording of
the interrogation in the case before them, they should weigh evidence of the defendant’s alleged
statement with great caution and care.” DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 533-34.
200. N.J. R. CT. 3:17(a).
201. Order Amending Rules of Evidence, No. 94S00-0909-MS-4 (Ind. 2009), available at
http://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Evidence_Rule_617.pdf (requiring audio and visual recording of custodial
interrogations, with limited exceptions); see also IND. R. EVID. 617(a) (the amended rule).
202. Other jurisdictions with a statutory recording requirement include the District of Columbia, New
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2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-16(A) (West 2013); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-4-406-411 (West 2013);
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-4501-4508 (West 2013); N.C. Gen. Stat Ann. § 15A-211 (West 2013); Wis.
Stat. Ann. §§ 968.073, 972.115 (West 2013).
203. 25 M.R.S.A. § 2803-B(1)(K) (2013).
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CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1129-30 (2005).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Miranda warnings are necessary to the maintenance of a fair criminal justice
system and to protect the constitutional rights of suspects and defendants. To
ensure these goals are met in practice, the Law Court should broaden its
consideration of the factors it announced in State v. Michaud when determining
whether a person is in custody during an interview or interrogation. A more
comprehensive analysis of the ten factors may also shed light on the weight and
value that should be given to various factual circumstances, which would help
develop more informative precedent to use in future cases. Including a defendantspecific factor into the analysis could be an additional way to protect suspects from
coercive police tactics by recognizing that some individuals may react differently
than others to certain situations and pressures. A purely objective inquiry for
Miranda purposes may be simpler to evaluate, but when the result affects whether
or not a defendant’s confession is presented to a jury, the consequences of violating
a person’s rights may outweigh the benefit of simplicity. Maine should also
consider a policy that incentivizes the recording of interviews and interrogations in
which suspects make incriminating statements to ensure that the circumstances of a
particular interview are accurately presented in a later proceeding. If the Law
Court had followed the alternative approaches in this Note, the result in Kittredge
may have been different.
The importance of an interrogation’s status as “custodial” cannot be
overstated, and the method a court uses to arrive at that determination is the key.
While Maine’s current test is comprehensive as to objective considerations, it
should be reviewed to ensure that, in practice, it is achieving its intended result
while protecting the rights of citizens against self-incrimination.

